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o. Introduction 
The subject of this article is the semantics of focus, i.e. the development of a framework in 
which we can formulate the influence of focus on the semantic and pragmatic interpretation. 
In section (1), I will discuss such a framework, structured meanings. In section (2), I will point 
out some of its shortcomings, as it is currently worked outi they have to do with cases 
involving multiple foci. In (3), I develop a general representation format in which we can cope 
with these problematic cases. Finally, in (4) I will discuss some extensions and possible 
problems, among others a combined semantic treatment of focus and topic. 
1. The Structured Meaning Approach to Focus 
Some common assumptions of current theories on the syntax and semantics of focus, essentially 
going back to Jackendoff (1972), are the following: 
- Focus consists of a feature that is assigned to a node in the syntactic representation of a 
sentence (in theories that distinguish between different representation levels, focus is as­
signed at surface structure). 
- The focus feature might be associated with a focus operator, such as onlYi the focus operator 
has to c-command its focus. We call this "bound focus". 
- In phonology, the focus feature is spelled out by sentence accent (I disregard other ways of 
marking focus, such as cleft constructions). In case of a complex category, the position of the 
sentence accent may be sensitive to syntactic structure and to semantic properties such as 
givenness. For example, for English and German it has been argued that in a case where a 
head-argument structure is in focus, the accent is realized on the argument (d. Selkirk 1984, 
von Stechow &t Uhmann 1987). Also, it has been argued that constituents that refer to entities 
given in the context are deaccented, although they may be part of the focus (d. Ladd 1980, 
Uitscher 1983). 
- In semantics, the focus feature induces a partition of the semantic representation of the 
sentence into the part that is in focus and the complement part that is not in focus, commonly 
called the background. This partition is essential for the semantics and/or pragmatics of the 
sentence. 
1 2 7  
.. _ 1.. _ _  J... ... - A.  
.. 
1 2 8  
Let US get more specifiC by looking at an example: 
(1 ) John only introduced Bill to SUE. 
This sentence, with accent on Sue, has at least two readings: (i) The only person John in­
troduced Bill to is Sue; (ij) the only thing John did is introducing Bill to Sue. For the first case, 
we can assume that Sue is in focus; in the second case, we can assume that intTOduceil Bill to 
Sue is in focus. The rules of focus marking by accent lead to the same result in both cases (in the 
latter one, accent is realized on the last argument). The adverbial particle only c-commands 
the focus in both cases. 
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There are essentially two representation formats that were designed to capture the con­
bibution of the partitioning into focus and background to the semantic interpretation, namely 
STRUC11JRED MEANINGS (d. Klein . von Stechow 1982, Jacobs 1983, also Williams 1980) 
and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTICS (Roath 1985). Here, I will concentrate on the structured 
meanings framework; see von Stechow (1989) for a comparison. 
A structured meaning is a pair consisting of a background part and a focus part. The background 
is of a type that can be applied to the focus. If this application is carried out, we arrive at the 
ordinary semantic representation. Focus-sensitive operators are applied to these structured 
meanings. The two readings of our example are represented as follows: 
(2) a. only(<l.x.lDtrod(j,x,b), 5» 
b. oD1y{<l.P.P(j), b.introd(x,s,b» ) 
Let us assume the following semantics for only. It says that the background representation 
applies to the focus representation, and that the background representation applies to no 
other entity that is comparable with the focus representation (see section 4.1 for a more 
refined treatment, distinguishing assertional meaning and presuppositional meaning). 
Comparability, which will be discussed shortly, is expressed by -. 
(3) only« a,Jl» :H a(�) . VX(X� . a(X) -. X=�], 
where X is a variable of the type of �. 
For our two examples, we get the following representations: 
(4) a . lDtroci(j,s,b) . \fx[x-s . iDtrocl(j,x,b) -. x=s] 
b. lDtrod(j,s,b) . \fP[P-1x.introd(x,s,b) . p(J) -. P=1xJntrod(x,s,b») 
-
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This says that John introduced Bill to Sue, and (a) there is  no individual comparable but not 
identical to Sue that John introduced Bill to, or (b) that there is no property comparable but 
not identical to introducing Bill to Sue that John has. 
The limitation to comparable entities is meant to capture contextual and ontological re­
strictions. For example, the lint reading might be true even if John introduced more persons to 
Sue, but these persons are not contextually salient (this is the case if the sentence is used to 
answer a question like Did John introduce Bill tu,d Paul to Sue?). The second reading depends 
even more on this restriction; without it, it would express that introducing Blll to Sue is the 
only property John has, which of course cannot be true, as he has many additional properties, 
like being a man, or being identical to himself (d. Lerner &t Zimmermann 1983). The 
restriction can be expressed in various ways, as a condition formulated with respect to the 
meaning of the expression in focus, as suggested here (d. also Roath 1985), or alternatively as 
a condition formulated with respect to the meaning of the background expression, as suggested 
in Jacobs (1988). As the precise semantics of only and other operators is not at stake here, I 
will not elaborate on this point further. 
We have seen how the partitioning into focus and background affects the interpretation of a 
sentence containing a focus..sensitive operator. Similarly, it may affect the interpretation of a 
sentence where no overt focus-sensitive operator is present. For example, the two 
interpretations of the sentence 
(5) John introduced Bill to SUE. 
might be used in different contexts, depending on the focus; with focus on Sue, it might be an 
answer to To whom dill John introduce Bill?, and with focus on introduced Bill to Sue, it might 
be an answer to What dill John tID? 
According to Jacobs (1984), cases of bound focus and unbound ("free'') focus are actually not 
different at all. He proposes that the illocutionary operator that expresses the sentence mood 
(assertion, question, directive, optative etc.) may bind the focus. Let us assume ASSERT as 
assertion operator; then we get the following representations for the two readings: 
(6) a. ASSEKT(d",Jntrod(j,x,b), s» 
b. ASSEKT(<lP .P(j), lx.introd(x,s,b» ) 
Assertion of a structured representation <a, �> can be described as follows, following 
Jackendoff (1972): At the current point of discourse, the entities X for which a(X) holds are 
under discussion. and it is stated that, among these entities, it holds for � that a(�). For our 
example this means that in (a), the persons x for which it holds that John introduced Bill to x 
are under discussion, and in (b), the properties P that John has are under discussion. In both 
cases, it is stated that John introduced Bill to Sue. I skip here over different uses of free focus, 
like presentational vs. contrastive focus as argued for by Rochemont (1986); they might be 
handled by different Ulocutionary operators. 
The meaning of assertion can be specified more fonnally, given the concept of an assertion as a 
modification of shared assumptions of speaker and hearer. Let us call the shared assumptions 
the "common ground", which is represented simply by a set of possible worlds (d. Stalnaker 
1979), and let us assume that the semantic representation of a sentence 41 is a set of possible 
worlds (III). Then we can give the fonowing definition of assertion (d. Krifka 1990): 
(7) ASSEKT« a,Il» maps a common ground c to a common ground ft, where ft is the 
intersection of c with the set of possible worlds for which a(p) is true, i.e. 
c'=cn[a(�)] 
, 
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Felicity conditions (among others): 
a .  f!":IC (asserting a<P) makes a difference in the common ground), 
b. f!#lJ (the truth of a(P) must not be already excluded by c) 
c. There are X, with X-P and X."p, such that a(X) could have been asserted with 
respect to c. That is, it would have changed c, cn[a(X)];!C, it would not be 
excluded by c, cn[aOO] * 0, and would have yielded a different output context, 
cn[a(X)] * cn[a(p)]. 
Note that the partitioning between focus and background does not play any role for the 
semantics proper of the assertion operator, but affects only its felidty conditions. Conditions 
(a) and (b) guarantee that the proposition to be asserted is relevant - it should not already be 
established or excluded by the current common ground. Condition (c) says that it is relevant 
which contextually salient alternative is asserted - that is, the alternatives are assertable 
as well, and their assertion would make a difference. As usual, if the felidty conditions are 
not satisfied, they may give rise to acmmmodations in the sense of Lewis (1979). 
2. Multiple Foci 
The theory of structured meanings seems to work quite well in examples like the ones con­
sidered above. However, we also find cases in which a sentence has more than one focus. 
One kind of multiple focus that has been discussed (d. Taglicht 1984, Roath 1985, von Stechow 
1989, Jacobs 1988, to appear) are cases like the following one: 
(8) John only introduced BILL to SUE. 
This sentence has a reading saying that the only pair of persons such that John introduced the 
first to the second is Bill and Sue. We clearly have two fod, on Bill and on Slle, that are 
related to only one focus operator, only. 
It is relatively straightforward to account for cases like (8): We have to allow for back­
grounds to be applied to more than one focus. There are different methods to implement this 
technically. Perhaps the most perspicuous way is to provide for USTS in our semantic 
representation language. Sentence (8) then gets the following analysis: 
(9) ODly(dx-y.introd(j,y,x), b-s» 
Here, be. is a list of two names, and x-y is a list of two variables (which can be bound by a 
lambda-operator). If we represent a list variable by h-t (where h is the head and t is the 
tail), application is defined recursively as 1h-t.4'(a-p) = It[lh.4'(a)](p). Given the re­
presentation (9) and the interpretation of only in (3), we get the following interpretation: 
(10) introd(j,s,b) Ir: \fxey[xey-bes Ir: introd(J,y,x) ... xey=bes] 
This says that John introduced Bill to Sue, and that there is no pair comparable but not 
identical to Bill and Sue such that John introduced the first to the second. This is an adequate 
analysis of the natural interpretation of this sentence. 
To distinguish this case of multiple foci from others discussed later, I will not call it multiple 
focus, but CDMPLEX focus. 
There are cases of true multiple fad, that is, cases with more than one focus operator, as 
shown by Jacobs (1984, 1988, to appear). To distinguish between different pairs of focus 
operator and associated focus, I will follow Jacobs in using a coindexing convention (although 
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there will be no coindexing in my final proposal). Perhaps the simplest case i s  exemplified by 
the following sentences: 
(1 1 )  Evenl OOHN]F1 drank onln lWATER]F2. 
Here we have one sentence that contains two focus operators and two foci. In this case, the foci 
do not overlap. Let us assume that eoen contributes to the meaning that there are alternatives 
to the focus for which it would be more probable that the proposition holds. For example, 
erma JOHN "me says that John came, and that there are persons for which it was more 
likely that they came. Then the meaning of (11) can be rendered as: John drinks water and no 
other comparable substance, and there are persons for which it would have been more likely 
that they drink water and no other mmparable substance. 
TIle next example shows that within one focus, we can have another pair of focus operator and 
focus: 
(12) Oobn, who is quite notorious as a party guest, did not only behave well at 
yesterdays party,] 
he evenl [oniY2 [drank WATER]F21Fl. 
(12) says that John drank water, that John did not do other, comparable things, and that 
there are activities comparable to drinking water and doing nothing else for which it is more 
probable that John performed them. 
TIle next case we will mnsider are examples where two operators seem to share one focus: 
(13) [At yesterday's party, people stayed with their first choice of drink. Bill only 
drank WINE, Sue only drank BEER. and ] 
John evenl onin drank lW ATER]F2,Fl 
The meaning of (13) can be rendered as: John drank water, John did not drink something that is 
mmparable but not identical to water, and there are things X that are mmparable but not 
identical to water such that it would be more likely that John drank X and only X. 
Fmally, we have cases where one focus operator forms the focus of another one: 
(14) [Most people drank water at some time during yesterday's party.] 
John evenl drank [ONLY21F1 [water]F2 
This means that John drank water and only water (i.e. nothing mmparable to water), and 
that there are alternatives X to only such that Joim tlrtln1c X JDtIter would be more probable. It 
seems that the only alternative to only is .Iso; witness the common locution not only ... , but 
.Iso ..•. Hence the last part of the meaning has to be spelled out as: It was more likely that 
John drank also water (i.e. drank water in addition to other things), than that John drank 
only water. 
TIle phenomenon of multiple focus is of morse more widespread when we follow the analysis 
of "free" foci given in Jambs (1984). Then every sentence that mntains an overt focus operator 
actually will have at least two foci, one related to the overt operator, and one related to the 
iUocutionary operator. Jambs (to appear) discussed this case with the following example (15) 
to which he assigned the two structures (a, b). 
(15) Peter kennt nor einen Roman von GOE'lHE. 
(Peter only knows a novel by GOE'lHE.) 
a .  ASSERTI Peter kennt nUll einen Roman wn [GOE'lHE]F1,F2 
b. ASSERTI Peter kennt [nUll einen Roman von [GOE'lHE1F21F1 
• . .. 
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Jacobs proposes RECURSIVE STRUCTURED MEANINGS for the semantic representation of 
these cases. For example, the reading (a) is represented as follows: 
(16) ASSERT(d.x.only(dy3z[novel(z) &r by(y,z) &r knows(p, z»), X» , g» 
Given the informal analyses of only and ASSERT developed above, we arrive at the fol­
lowing: It is asserted that John knows a novel by Goethe and that John does not know a novel 
by another, comparable person. And the felicity conditions are that those persons x are under 
discussion such that John knows only a novel by x. The other reading, (IS.c), should make the 
same assertion, but with respect to a different felicity condition, namely that the properties 
of Peter are under discussion. 
For a discussion of the accentual marking of sentences with multiple foci, see Jacobs (1988, to 
appear). In this article, I will try to give a compositional semantics of sentences with 
multiple foci, something which has not been done before - for example, Lyons &r Hirst (1990) 
exclude them explicitly from their discussion because they are "semantically complicated". I 
will presuppose the following assumptions, which are suggested by the examples we have 
seen so far: 
- There is a one-to-one mapping between focus operators and foci. Remember that I assumed 
cases like (8) to contain only one, albeit complex, focus. 
- Focus is assigned to constituents, or (in case of complex focus) to sets of non-overlapping 
constituents (see section 4.8 for potential counterexamples). 
- Focus operators c�ommand their focus. This is obvious in the cases of overt operators we 
have considered so far. A potentially problem arises with illocutionary operators. Some 
illocutionary operators in some languages obviously c�ommand the whole sentence; one 
example is the interrogative est-qlle ce in French. In other cases, different sentence moods are 
expressed by distinctions in syntactic structure (inversion), intonation, or special categories of 
the finite verb. We have to assume that, on some level of syntactic representation, these 
markings are spelled out by operators with widest scope. Some potential problems with overt 
operators are discussed in section 4.2. 
- If one focus operator c�mmands directly (i.e. without intervening other focus operators) two 
or more foci, one including the others, then it is associated with the most comprehensive focus: 
(17) IUi/., [ a [ p [ Y]Fj P )FilX ], 
where a does not contain focus operators that �mmand p. 
The only candidate of such a construction we have seen so far is (13), a case where two focus 
operators seem to be associated with the same focus. This example then has to be analyzed as: 
John evenl onlY2 drank [[water)Fl]F2: The focus operator only is associated with the most 
comprehensive focus, F2. Of course, this example does not really motivate our assumption. 
However, the discussion of the issues involved here are relatively complicated, and I will 
come back to it in section 4.6. 
- There is a certain tendency that a focus operator occurs as close as possible to its focus. 
However, it seems that there are no bounding nodes; witness the following example (which 
goes back to Jackendoff 1972): 
(18) Sam event saw [NP the man [s who was wearing a [RED)F1 hat)). 
In this example, the scope of wen (not to be confused with its focus) is the phrase SIl'ID the man 
who was wearing a red hat; and as it has to c�ommand its scope, it cannot occur deeper 
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embedded in the syntactic tree. However, its focus red i s  embedded in  an  NP and an S, thus 
showing that the operator-focus association does not obey subjacency. Therefore an analysis of 
focus that implies movement of the focus constituent, such as Chomsky (1977), is questionable 
(d. also the discussion in section 4.3). 
- Foc:us-sensitive operators, especially grading particles like only and wen, can be applied to 
a wide variety of categories - among them VPs and NPs (see examples above) and APs (d. an 
even bigger apple) . 
3. Deriving Representations with Focus Compositionally 
In this section, I will specify compositional rules for recursive structured meanings. The 
framework must be flexible enough to cover the cases of complex foci and multiple foci we 
have considered so far, represented by the following examples: 
(19) a. John onlyt introduced [Bill]F1 to [Sue]F1. 
b. Even1 Oohn]Fl drank onln [water]F2. 
c. John even1 [onln [drank water]F'21F1. 
d. John even1 onln drank [[ water]Fl]F2 
e. John even1 drank [onlY21F1 [water]F2 
Focus-background structun!S will be represented by pairs <a.P> of a background meaning a and 
a focus meaning p. We must provide a type for these structures; if the type of a and p are a and 
't, respectively, the type of <a,p> will be denoted by <a,'t>. In general, we assume the 
following type system: 
(20) Definition of Types: 
a .  e, t (entities, truth values) 
b. If a, 't are types, then 
- (a)'t is a type (of functions from a-denotations to 't-denotations); 
- (Je't is a type (of a list of a-denotations and 't-denotations); 
- <G,'t> is a type (of a focus-background structure) 
I assume that focus-sensitive operators always are applied to entities of a type that ends in t, 
such as intransitive predicates, type (e)t, predicate modifiers, type «e)t)(e)t, etc. The only 
case where this is problematic is names or pronouns, which arguably are of type e. But we can 
analyse names and pronouns, like NPs in general, as generalized quantifiers, type «e)t)t, and 
thus get a type ending in t. This assumption about the types of the operands of focus.sensitive 
operators will allow a relatively simple treatment, without employing rules of operator 
raising, quantifying in, or operator storage. 
Semantic rules typically involve functional application. But functional application has to be 
generalized to cover focus-background structures. In particular, we must provide for a rule that 
allows for focus- background-information to be projected to higher nodes. So we have to define 
an extended version of functional application that takes care of this case. 
(21 )  Recursive definition of extended application "( )": 
a .  If a is of type (a)'t and p is of type a, then a(p) is of type 't and i s  interpreted as 
functional application. 
b. Focus inheritance from operator: 
If <a,p> is of type « a)('t)JI.,a'> and y is of type 't, then <a,p>(y) is of type 
« a)Jl.p'>, and is interpreted as dXa.[a(X)(y)], P>. 
c. Focus inheritance from argument 
T""" ,-::- � .. 
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If T is  of  type (an and <a,�> is  of type <{J,L)o',JI.'>, then l« a,�» is  of  type 
« Jl.n,JI.'>, and is interpreted as d.xJl..l<a(X»,�>. 
d. Focus inheritance from operator and argument 
If <a,�> is of type « a)('t)JI.,O" > and <T,b is of type « un. u'>, then 
<a,�>(<T'&» is of type « aeu}JI.,O" .u'>, and is interpteted as 
<AXaeYu.[a(X)(oy(Y»), �e6>, where X, Y are distinct variables. 
In these definitions, Xa stands for a variable of type 0'. (21 .a) describes the basic case of 
functional application. (b) and (c) say that the focus is stored when a focus-background 
structure is combined with an argument, or a function that does not take focus-background 
structures. The variable X makes sure that the original focus can be recovered after the 
application. (d) is the rule for complex focus; it concatenates two foci and their corresponding 
variables to a list, which is stored. Note that I do not assume, in general, that the first 
argument of the background is of the same type as the focus; but in all real applications, these 
types will stand in the relation of BEING DERIVED FROM. For example, a focus-background 
structure of type « an, 0'> should be said to be derived from "C (the type of the representation 
when the background is applied to the focus). 5imilarly, a complex focus-background structure 
of type « JI.)« an, O'>, JI.'> is said to be derived from type « an, 0'>, and ultimately derived 
from type "C. This suggests the following definition: 
(22) Definition of "be derived from": 
a .  Every type "C is derived from "C. 
b. Every type « an, JI.> is derived from "C. 
c. If "C is derived from '(, and "C' is derived from "C", then "C is derived from "C". 
I give some examples to show how this framework can be used to formulate grammatical rules 
that cover focus-sensitive constructions. Let us assume the following rules; their syntactic part 
is dehberately kept simple. If A is a syntactic tree, then [A] is the semantic representation of 
A in our semantic representation language. I take intransitive verbs to be of the category VP, 
transitive verbs to be of the category V, and ditransitive verbs to be of the category V. Let x, 
y, z, x' etc. be variables of type e; P, po etc. variables of type (e)t; R, R' etc. variables of type 
(e)(e)t; 5, 5' etc. variables of type (e)(e)(e)t; and T, T etc. variables of type «e)t)t, which 
will be abbreviated by q. The variable 0 is used for focus-sensitive operators, which might be 
of different types; I use fo as an abbreviation of these types fo. 
(23) 51 5 -> NP VP; 
[[5 NP vp)] = [NP]([VP]), 
52 VP -> V' NP; 
[[vp V NP)] II: uu.nx.T(1y.R(x,y»([V'])([NP]), 
53 VP -> Vto to NP; 
[[vp Vto to NP)] II: uu.nx.T(1y.R(x,y»([Vto) ([NP]), 
54 Vto -> V NP; 
[[Vto V NP)] = 151nyb.T(1z.S(x,y,z»([V])([NP]), 
5F C -> CF (indexing of ubitrary category C by focus feature F>; 
[CF] = dX.x, [C]» ,  where X is of the type from which the type of [C] is de­
rived that is not a focus-baclcground type. 
50 C -> FO C (F(): category of focus operators); 
--
.. 
I. , . 
1 3 5  
[[e FO en = A<X,Y>lO[AZ.O« X,z>)(Y»)([e])([FO», where <X, Y> is a focus­
background structure variable of the type of [e], and 0 is a variable of the type of 
the operator [PO]. 
The first four rules specify the binding of argument places of verbs by NPs. Rule Sp covers the 
focusation of a mnstituent. The feature P has to be realized appropriately by sentence accent. 
Rule SO covers focus operators; its function will become clear below. 
Let us now look at the derivation of some examples. I start with an example of complex focus, 
(19.a), which shows the use of lists. In the following derivation tree, I specify the syntactic 
expression, its category, its representation, and the type of its representation. I also give the 
syntactic/semantic rules (23), and sometimes the subelauses for the extended application 
which I use (21). The terms John, Sue, Bill are taken to be quantifiers; we have e.g. John = 
AP.P(j). In this and the following examples, I first give a representation using coindexing; this 
is for clarification only and has no theoretical status. 
(24) John onIyt introduced [Bill)F1 to [Sue)F1. 
Bill i NP i Bill i «e)t)t (abbrev. q) 
I 
Sp Bill i NPp i d.T.T, Bill> i « q)q, q> 
I 
I introdllced i V i Introd i (eXe)(e)t 
1 /  
S4 introdllced Bill i V to i 
151nylx.T(b.s(x,y,z»(lntrod)(d.T.T, Bill» 
a . 1nyb.T(b.lntrod(x,y,z»« 1T.T, Bill» 
c - dT[1nyh.T(b.introd(x,y,z»(1T.T(TI»), Bill> 
a - <1T1yh.T(b.introd(x,y,z», Bill> i « qXeXe)t, q> 
I 
I Sue i NP i Sue i q  
I I 
I Sp Sue i NPp i <1T.T, Sue> i « q)q, q> 
1 /  
S3 introdllced Bill to Sue i VP 
1R1Tb.T(1y.R(x,y»(dT1yb.T(b.introd(x,y,z», Bill» (dT.T, Sue» 
Application of first argument: 
c <1T[1R1Th.T(1y.R(x,y» <1nyh.T(b.introd(x,y,z»m»), Bill> 
a = <1T[U1nx.T(1y.R(x,y» (1yh.T(b.introd(x,y,z)))), Bill> 
a = <1T1T1x.T(1y[1yh.T(b.lntrod(x,y,z»(x,y))), Bill> 
a = dnTb.T(1y.T(b.introd(x,y,z»), Bill> 
Application of second argument: 
<1nTh.T(1y.T(b.introd(x,y,z))), Bill> « 1T.T, Sue» 
d = <1T-T[1T1Th.T(1y.T(b.introd(x,y,z)))m(1T.T(T))), Bill-Sue> 
a = dT-T1x.T(1y.T(b.introd(x,y,z))), Bill-Sue> i « q-qXe)t, q-q> 
I 
'-" , " -" . 
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I only ; FO ; only ; fo 
1 /  
So only introduced Bill to Slle ; VP ; 
l<X,Y>lO[U.O« X,z» (y)]« lT-T'1x.T'(ly.T(1z.introd(x,y,z»), Bill-Sue» 
(only) 
Application of first argument: 
a lO[U.O( <1 T-T'1x. T'(ly. T(1z.introd(x,y ,z))), Z> )(Bill-Sue» 
a = 1O.0« lT-T'1x.T'(ly.T(1z.introd(x,y,z))), Bill-Sue» 
Application of second argument: 
a only« lT-T'1x.T'(ly.T(1z.introd(x,y,z»), Bill-Sue» 
Let us assume a meaning postulate for only that is like (3) but allows only to be applied to all 
expressions of a type that ends in t: 
(25) only« a, Il» :4-+ 1v[a(IlXv) &: 'IX[X-Il &: a(XXv) � X=IlJJ, 
where X is a variable of the type of Il and v is a (vector 00 variable(s) of the 
types of the arguments of a(1l). 
Then example (24) am be spelled out as follows: 
(24')  only introduced Bill to Sue ; 1x[Sue(ly.BIll(Az.introd(x,y,z)))] &: 
VT-T'[T-T'-Sue.BiIl &: T(ly.T'(1z.lntrod(x,y,z))) -+ T-T'=Sue-BillJJ ; (e)t 
Application of the subject yields the following result: 
(24") I laIm ; NP ; Jobn ; q  
1 /  
Sl 101m only introduced Bill to Slle ; S ;  Jobn(1x[Sue(ly.BiIl(1z.lntrod(x,y,z»» &: 
VT-T'[T-T'-Sue-BUI &: T(ly.T'(1z.introd(x,y,z») � T-T'=Sue-Bill))) ; t 
Spelling out the quantifiers wlll yield the following: 
(24"' ) introd(j,s,b) &: VT-T'[T-T'-AP .P(s)-AP.P(b) &: Introd(j,x,y) -+ 
T-T' .. AP.P(s)-AP.P(b)] 
Now we am assume that quantifiers generated by an individual, such as AP.P(s), are com­
parable only to quantifiers that are generated by an individual as well (note that a sentence 
like only lohn luis II c.r cannot be refuted by No, II mIIn luis II c.r, too.). Furthermore, we 
should assume that if two lists are comparable, then their respective elements are 
comparable. Then we am reduce (24-) to the following interpretation: 
(24 "") introd(J,s,b) &: \fxey[xey .. -b &: introd(j,x,y) � xey=s-b] 
This says: John introduced Bill to Sue, and that there is no pair x and y comparable, but not 
identical to Sue and Bill such that John introduced y to x. 
Next, we will look at an example with two independent focus operators, (19.b). We assume 
here the following semantics of even: 
(26) even« a, Il» :4-+ 1v[a(IlXv) &: 3X[X-1l &: a(Il)(v) <p a(X)(v))), 
where v and X as in (25) and <p is a probability relation. 
Thus, even contributes to the meaning that there are alternatives X to the focus Il such that 
a(Il)(v) is less probable than a(XXv). In addition, we could try to incorporate that a(IlXv) is 
considered ''unlikely" in general; however, the proposed analysis should suffice for our 
purpose, as we are not concerned with a detailed analysis of the semantics of even (see Jacobs 
1983, Kay 1990 for that). 
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Our example can now be derived as follows, given an  analysis o f  water as  generalized 
quantifier U'3X[p(x) &: W(x»), where W is a predicate applying to water quantities. 
(27) . Even1 Uohn)F1 drank onlY2 [water)F2. 
WGter ; NP ; water ; q 
I 
5F WGfer ; NPp ; «T.T, water> ; « q)q, q> 
I 
I only ; FO ; cmly ; io  
1 /  
So only WGfer ; NP ;  only(d.T.T, water» 
.. 1P[water(P) &: vrrr-ater &: T(P) -. T=water)) ; q 
I 
I drank ; V' ; clrank ; (e)(e)t 
1 /  
52 drtlnk only fiNder ; VP ; 
1x[1P[water(P) &: vrrr-ater &: T(P) -. T-water))(ly.clrank(x,y))) 
- 1x[wateJ(ly.clraDk(x,y» &: 'VT[T_ater &: T(ly.clraDk(x,y» -. T=water)) 
1x[3y[clraDk(x,y) &: W(y») &: VP[P-W &: 3y[clrank(x,y) &: P(y») -. P=W)) ; (e)t 
lohn ; NP  ; Jobn ; q 
I 
5F 101m ; NPp ; «T.T, John> ; « q)q, q> 
I 
I eom ; FO ; eftIl ; fo  
1 /  
So even lohn ; NP ;  eYen« lT.T, Jolm» 
1 /  
= 1P[Jobn(P) &: 3'llT-Jobn &: Jobn(P) <p T<P>ll 
= 1P[P(j) &: 3x[x-j &: P(j) <p P(x»)); q 
51 even lohn drtlnk only ater ; 5 ; 
3y[clrank(j,y) &: W(y) &: VP[p-W &: 3y[cIraDk(j,y) &: P(y)) -+ P=W]) &: 
3x[x-j &: 3y[clraDk(j,y) &: W(y) &: VP[p-W &: 3y[draDk(j,y) &: P(y») -. P=W]) <p 
3y[clraDk(x,y) &: W(y) &: Vp[p-W &: 3y[clrank(x,y) &: P(y») -+ P=W])) 
This says (a) that John drank water, and no other comparable substance, and (b) that there 
are comparable individuals x' for which it is more probable that they drank only water. This 
is a correct interpretation of our example. We assumed here that indefinite quantifiers like 
A.P[p(x) &: W(x») are compatible only to other indefinite quantifiers, hence we can reduce the 
condition T_ater to P-W. 
To obtain this reading, it is crucial that even gets scope over only. This scope relationship is a 
consequence of the fact that the NP to which even is adjoined has only in its scope (or 
syntactically, only is c-commanded by that NP). The syntactic rules guarantee the right 
scoping. 
We have seen how cases are handled in which one operator is in the scope of another. Our 
next example concerns a case in which one operator is not only in the scope, but also in the 
focus, of another, namely (19.c). 
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(28) John even1 [onlY2 [drank water]F21F1. 
dnmk fDGter i VP i Ax3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)] i (e)t 
I 
SF drtlnJc fDGter i VPp i <1P.P, b3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)]> i <((e)t)(e)t, (e)i> 
I 
I only i FO i only i fo 
1 /  
So only drtlnJc fDGter i VP i 
only(dP.P, Wy[drank(x,y) &: W(y)]» 
= 1x[3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)] &: VP[P-Ax3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)] &: P(x) -+ 
P=Wy[drank(x,y) &: W(y)]]] (= [1], for short) i (e)t 
I 
SF only drtlnJc rDGter i VPF i dP.P, [1]> i <((e)t)(e)t, (e)t> 
I 
I mm i FO i even i fo 
1 /  
So mm only drtlnJc water i VP i 1x[[t](x) &: 3P[p .. [1] &: [1](x) <p P(x))) i (e)t 
I 
I lohn i NP  iJolm i e  
1 /  
S1 101m mm only drtlnlc water i S i [1](J) &: 3p[P-[t] &: [1](j) <p P(j))) i t 
This says that John drank water, that he did nothing comparable, and that there are 
properties comparable to the property of drinking water and doing nothing else such that it 
would have been more likely that John had them. This is a correct representation of the 
reading of our example. 
Let us now look at the treabnent of (19.d), where two operators seem to share one focus. In our 
reconstruction, a focus operator can be associated with only one focus. But we may apply the 
focusation rule to one constituent twice, one time for each operator, and get an adequate 
interpretation: 
(29) John event onI}'2 drank [[water]F1]F2 
..,.. 
1-
fDGter i NP i water i q 
I 
SF fDGter i NPp i <1T.T, water> i « q)q, q> 
I 
SF fDGter i NPpp i <1T.T, <1T.T, water» i « q)q, « q)q, q» 
I 
I d",nJc i V' i drank i (e)(e)t 
1 /  
S2 drtlnJc fDGter i VP i 
A1UTb.T(1yR(x,y»(drank)(d.T.T, <1T.T, water») 
c = <1T1x.T(1y.drank(x,y», <1T.T, water» i « q)(e)t, « q)q, q» 
I 
T"" To �� 
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I only ; FO ; only ; fo 
1 /  
So only drank fDtlter ; VP ; 
A<X,Y>AO[U.O(<x,z» (Y)](<ATb.T(Ay.drank(x,y», <AT.T, water:» )(only) 
a = U.only(dTA.x.T(Ay.drank(x,y», Z>)(dT.T, water:» 
c = dT.only« ATA.x.T(Ay.drank(x,y», T» , water> ; « q)(e)t, q> 
I 
I mm ; FO ; even ; fo 
1 /  
So even only drank fDtlter ; VP ; 
A<X,Y>AO[AZ.O« X,z» (Y)]« AT.only« ATA.x.T(Ay.drank(x,y», T» , wa­
ter» )(even) 
= even« AT.only« ATA.x.T(Ay.drank(X,y», T» , wateD) 
Spelling out even yields 
b[Only« ATA.x.T(Ay.drank(x,y», water:>)(x) &: 
3T(T-water &: only« ATA.x.T(Ay.drank(x,y», water>)(x) <p 
only« ATA.x.T(Ay.drank(X,y», T>)(x)])] 
Spelling out oaly yields 
b[water(Ay.drank(X,y» &: \>'T[T-water &: T(Ay.drank(X,y» -+ T=water] &: 
3T[T'-water &: 
[water(Ay.drank(X,y» &: VT[T-water &: T(Ay.drank(X,y» -+ T=water ] <p 
[T'(Ay.drank(X,y» &: VT[T-T' &: T(Ay.drank(X,y» -+ T=T')))) 
Spelling out water and binding the subject argument by j (via rule 51) yields as 
representation of John eoen only drank fJ1tlter: 
3y[drank(j,y) &: W(y)] &: VP[P-W &: 3y[drank(j,y) &: P(y)] -+ P=W] &: 
3P'[P'-W &: 
3y[drank(j,y) &: W(y) &: VP[P-W &: 3y[draDk(j,y) &: P(y)] -+ P=W)) <p 
3y[drank(j,y) &: P'(y) &: 'Vp[p-P' &: 3y[drank(j,y) &: P(y)] -+ P=W])] 
This says (a) that John drank water and no other comparable substance, and (b) that there is a 
substance P comparable to water such that it would have been more probable that John drank 
only that substance. This renders the reading of our example adequately. 
It is crucial for this derivation that the lint focus operator, tmly, is associated with the last 
focus feature of the NP, leaving additional focus features to other operators. This is 
accomplished by the semantic rule for the combination of a focus operator with a constituent 
(23, So). This rule expects a focus-background structure, but allows for the focus to consist 
itself of a focus-background structure, which would then be passed to the complex semantic 
representation, such that it can be submitted to higher operators. Also, with this example it 
becomes obvious why the semantic part of rule SF was formulated in that compHcated way 
(''X is of the type from which the type of (A) is derived that is not a focus-background type"). 
Finally, let us look at a case in which one operator is the focus of another, (19.e). 
(30) Johri even1 drank [onlyilFl [water]F2 
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WGter ; NP ; water ; q 
I 
SF WGter ; NPp ; dT.T, water> ; « q)q, q> 
I 
I only ; FO ; only ; fo 
I I 
I SF only ; FOp ;  dO.O, only> ; « fo)fo, fo> 
1 /  
So only WGter ; NP ; 
1<X,Y>10{AZ.Q(<x,z>)(Y)](d.T.T, water» « 10.0, only» 
= dO.Q« 1T.T, wateD), only> ; « fo)q, fo> 
I 
I drank ; V' ; clrank ; (e)(e)t 
1 /  
S2 d,."nk only fDtlter ; VP ; 
dO.0« 1Tb[T(1y.clrank(x,y», wateD), only>; « fo)(e)(e)t, fo> ; 
abbr. dO.O([1]), only> 
I 
I mm ; FO ; even ; fo  
1 /  
So erJflJI tlrtmk only UItlter ; NP ; even« 10.Q([1J), only» 
.. 1x[only([1J)(x) 6: 3O[D-only 6: on1y([IJXx) <p Q([IJ)(x))) ; q ; abbr. [2J 
I 
I John ; NP ;  1P.P(j) ; q 
1 /  
SI John eDen d,."nk only fDtlter ; S ; [2J(j) 
= only([IJ)(j) 6: 3O(D-only 6: only([1])(j) <p Q([1J)(j))) 
= 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: VP[p-W 6: 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: P(y)J -+ P=W)) 6: 
3O[D-only 6: 
3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: \fPlP-W 6: 3y(drank(j,y) 6: P(y)J -+ P=W)) <p 
Q« 1T.T, W» (1y.clrank(j,y»))) 
This says (a) that John drank water, and no other comparable substance, and that the 
proposition (a) is less probable than another one where only is replaced by a focus operator 
comparable with only. Let us assume that the only comparable operator is mo, and let us 
specify the meaning of also as follows: 
(31 )  also« a, JS» :++ 1v[a(JS)(v) 6: 3X[X-JS 6: "X=JS 6: a(X)(v))), 
where v and X as in (25). 
That is, also says that the background representation applies to the focus representation, and 
that in addition there is an entity comparable with, but different from the focus re­
presentation to which the background representation applies as well. Then we get the 
following representation for our example: 
(32) 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: VP[p-W 6: 3y(clrank(j,y) 6: P(y)J -+ P=W)) 6: 
3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: \fP[P-W 6: 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: P(y)J -+ P=w]J <p 
3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: 3P[P-W 6: .. P=W 6: 3y[drank(j,y) 6: P(y)]]] 
This says that John drank water, and only water, and that the probability that John drank 
water and only water is smaDer than the probability that John drank water and also some 
other salient substance comparable with water. This is a correct representation of (19.e). 
... ... - .... . ... 
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Let U S  now tum to illocutionary operators. We assume that they get the widest scope, by a rule 
like the following one that combines a sentence (S) with an illocutionary operator (10) to an 
illocutionary complete sentence (SI): 
(33) SI SI -> 10 S (alternatively, S 10); 
([Si lO S)) = [IO]([S]), 
I give one simple example with the illocutionary operator ASSERT, represented ortho­
graphically by suffixing a fuDstop n.n, as the only focus operator: 
(34) John [drank water]F i s ; «P.P(j), Ax3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)]> ; <((e)t)t, (e)t> 
I 
I . ; IO ; ASSERT ; fo  
1/ 
SI John drank water. ; SI ; ASSERT(dP.P(j), Wy[drank(x,y) &: W(y)]» ; t 
Let us assume an analysis of assertion like in (7). We arrive at the following result: 
(35) ASSERndP<j), 1x3y[draIIk(x,y) &: W(y)]» maps a common ground c to a common 
ground c', where c' is the intersection of c with the set of possible worlds for 
which 3y[drank(j,y) &: W(y)] is true. 
Felicity conditions: oK, �, and there are salient P with P-Ax3y[drank(x,y) &: 
W(y)] and l'1tb3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)] such that the intersection of c with the 
set of worlds for which P() holds neither equals c, nor 0, nor c'. 
Thus, the assertion of John [drank _ter]F changes the common ground to those worlds in 
which John drank water. The felicity conditions say that this assertion is informative at the 
current point of discourse, that it is not excluded already, that there are other, salient 
properties comparable with the property of drinking water that could have been asserted of 
John as well, and that they would have made a difference. 
H the sentence which is asserted contains a focus operator, then it is necessary to introduce 
another focus; otherwise the application conditions for ASSERT could not be met. One ex­
ample: 
(36) only [drank rmder]F ; VP ; 
A.xl3y(drank(x,y) &: W(y)] &: VP[P-Ax3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)] &: Pc)� -+ 
P=b3y[drank(x,y) &: W(y)]]] (= [1], for short) i (e)t 
I 
SF only drank _ter ; VPp ; «P.P, [1]> ; <((e)t)(e)t, (e)t> 
I 
I Jdm i NP i Jobn ; q  
1 /  
S1 John only drank _fer ; S ;  «P.P() , [1]> i <((e)t)t, (e)t> 
I 
I . i lO i ASSERT i fo  
1 /  
SI John only drank water. i SI ; ASSERT(dP.P(j), [1]» i t 
We get the following representation: 
(37) (36) maps a common ground c to a common ground c', where r is the intersection of c 
with the set of possib1e worlds for which [1](j) is true. 
r .L. _ � Jl .... . .. .... .. " .  .. 
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Felidty conditions: C'I:C', c#lJ, and there are salient P' with P'�1] such that the 
intersection of c with the set of worlds for which P'(j) neither equals C, nor 0, nor 
c' . 
The assertion of (36) changes the common ground to those worlds in which John drank only 
water, under the felidty conditions that this proposition is possible at the current point of 
discourse and is informative, and that there are salient properties comparable with the 
property of drinking only water such that it would have been possible to assert them of John, 
and they would have made a difference. 
In concluding this section, I want to point out that we did not use any coindexing between focus 
operators and their focus. We could do without that because the function of indexing is 
inherent in the syntactic-semantic rules. They guarantee that each focus (which might be 
complex) is related to exactly one focus operator. If there were more focus operators than foci, 
then some operators could not be applied to a focus-background structure, thus yielding an 
illformed semantic representation. On the other hand, if there were more foci than focus 
operators to bind them, the final representation would consist of uninterpreted focus­
background structures, which again is illformed. The rules guarantee, furthermore, that a 
focus operator has scope over its focus. We can conclude that the proposed syntactic coindexing 
is both motivated and made redundant by the syntactic-semantic rules. 
4. Further Adaptations 
In this section, I will discuss some constructions that are problematic for the representation 
format developed above, and I will propose possible solutions. 
4.1 . DISCONTINUOUS CONSTITUENTS. - We have assumed that non-complex focus 
applies to syntactic constituents. There are, however, examples that show that this is not 
always he case. 
First, certain constructions suggest that focus may apply to discontinuous constituents. I give 
three examples, two from Gelman and one from English: 
(38) a .  Er hat [sich]F1 nur} [RASIERT]F1 
He has only shaved himself. 
b. Diese Tat [forderte]F1 seinen Ehrgeiz geradezu1 [HERAUS]F1. 
This act really challenged his ambition. 
c. John onlYl [tumed]F1 it [OFF]F1. 
In (38.a), a variation of an example in Jacobs (1983), the particle nllr clearly can focus on sich 
rtlSiert, but note that this forms a discontinous constituent on surface structure. Also, in (38.b) 
the particle gertulezu focusses on the verb her.llsfortlerte, which is discontinuous. Similarly, 
in (38.b) only may focus on tllm off, which again does not form a constituent on surface 
structure. 
One way to cope with such cases is to assume that certain transformations may follow focus 
assignment, that is, focus assignment does happen at a representation level prior to surface 
structure (d. 39.a for the case of 38.b). 
(39) a .  e e diese Tat seinen Ehrgeiz geradezu1 [HERAUS [forderte]]F1 
, 
� - &. ... _ .. 
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b. (diese Tat]i (forderte]j ti seinen Ehrgeiz geradezu1 (HERAUS lt�]F1 
Another indication that focus marking may apply to some level of deep structure is that in 
some cases the operator does not seem to c-c:ommand its focus. One example mentioned by 
Jackendoff (1972) is that ftIePJ (but not, e.g., only) might be associated with the subject as focus 
in (40): 
(40.a) JOHN (even) wiD (even) have given his daughter a new bicycle. 
According to Jackendoff, eDen c-commands the subject in both positions, as he assumed a "flat" 
structure ls NP (even) (AUXwill] (even) VP]. Alternatively, we might assume that the c­
command condition is checked at an underlying level of syntactic representation, or at a 
surface structure that contains traces, where it suffices that an operator c-commands the 
TRACE of its focus. The latter option was proposed by Jacobs (1986) for similar constructions in 
German. 
In any case, the syntactic and semantic rules specified above are strictly surface.oriented and 
hence cannot treat the phenomena discussed here as they stand. Changes along the lines 
suggested here are possible (that is, semantic rules that apply to non-surface structures or to 
enriched surface structures), but I will not carry out these modifications. 
4.2. FOCUS AND ILLOCUI10NARY OPERATORS. - We have assumed above that iDa­
cutionary operators always are associated with their own focus. This assumption probably 
must be qualified in several respects. For one thing, it is often difficult to determine, in a 
running text, where the foci should be. We might take this as an indication that iDocutionary 
operators do not need to be associated with a focus. There are other cases of operators that 
apparently can or cannot be associated with a focus, for example negation (sentence negation 
vs. constituent negation). Another reason to assume iUocutionary operators that are not 
focussing is that it sometimes seems artificial to propose for a sentence that already has an 
overt focus operator an additional iUocutionary focus. 
In some cases, we can argue that operators that seem to have their own focus actually modify 
or specify the i1locutionary operator, so that their apparent focus actually is the focus of that 
operator. This was proposed by Jacobs (1988) for sentence mood particles in German. A case 
which might be explained along the same lines is English even (deviating from the analysis 
given in the previous section). Even has several properties which distinguishes it from 
apparent counterparts like only. First, even always must have wide scope over other focus 
operators, like only (d. 41). Second, adverbial even might be related to subject focus, in 
contrast to adverbial only (d. Jackendoff 1972, 42). Third, focus on even seems to be barred, 
except in correction contexts (43). Finally, sentences with multiple even are considerably more 
difficult to get than sentences with multiple only; they have even been considered 
ungrammatical (d. Kay 1990, 44). 
(41 )  a . John even only dranlt water. 
b. ·John only even dranlt water. 
(42) a .  JOHN (even) wiD (even) have given his daughter a new bicycle. 
b. ·JOHN (only) will (only) have given his daughter a new bicycle. 
(43) a .  John ONLy dranlt water. 
b. ??John EVEN dranlt water. 
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(44) a .  Only JOHN drank only water. 
b. ??Even JOHN drank even water. 
One possible explanation for this behaviour of even might be along the lines in which Jacobs 
(1983) explained the possible scope relations between German sogar and nur, which are 
parallel to even and only. He showed that sogar is an affinnative polarity item, and that nUT 
does not license these items. However, English et1en may be (part of) a negative polarity 
item; d. if this costs even so much flS a dime, I would not buy it (note that German would use 
auch nUT instead of sogar in these contexts). 
The observations given above fall in their place if we assume that et1en actually modifies the 
ilIocutionary operator. Then it must have wide scope over other overt operators (we have 
assumed this for Dlocutionary operators in general), it may focus on the subject (because the 
ilIocutionary operator has the subject in its scope), it could never receive focus from the 
Dlocutionary operator (in a sense, it is part of that operator), and we should not expect 
multiple even, as the ilIocutionary operator is associated with only one focus. Concerning this 
latter point, it is interesting to note that the examples with multiple even are generally such 
that we have to put equal stress on both foci; such as the following one, going back to Fraser 
1970 (d. ICay 1990): 
(45) Even WORDS give trouble to even LlNGUISlS. 
But this would mean that the foci of flKJrds and linguists are not ordered with respect to each 
other; hence they should be described as one, complex, focus of the Dlocutionary operator 
modified by even. 
4.3. FOCUS AND MOVEMENT. - The theory of focus developed here does not imply any 
movement of the focus constituent. Jackendoff (1972), and later Roath (1985), argued against a 
movement analysis, as association with focus does not obey island constraints (d. 18). Not 
obeying syntactic constraints, focus should preferably be treated in the semantic 
representation language. The reason why Chomsky (1977) proposed an analysis of focus that 
involves LF-movement is that cmeferenc:e between a pronoun and a NP in focus seems to obey 
the same restrictions as coreference between a pronoun and a quantified NP. Quantified NPs, 
it is argued, have to move at LF, and preceding pronouns cannot be bound by them as this leads 
to crossover constellations. The relevant data are as follows; (46.a) shows that binding is o.k. 
with (non-moving) names, (b) shows that a focused NP cannot bind the pronoun, and (c) shows 
that quantified NPs behave Similarly: 
(46) a .  After bet came home, Johni went to bed. 
b. ·After bet came home, JOHNi went to bed. 
Johnj [after hei went home, ti went to bed] 
c. • After bet came home, someonej went to bed. 
Someonej [after bet went home, ti went to bed] 
A different explanation for the unavailability of (46.b), which does not recur to movement, is 
that expressions with a focus feature cannot refer to something that is given in the immediate 
context (47.a), except when used contrastively (47.b). 
(47) a .  ·John and Mary came in. JOHN kissed Mary. 
b. John lcissed Mary, and then MARY kissed JOHN. 
One observation that supports this reinterpretation of (46.b) is that these sentences get much 
better in the case of contrastive focus (d. also Lujan 1986 for related data): 
.a 
.,.. 
(48) Mter hej had kissed her� MARYj kissed JOHNi 
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Another phenomenon that prima facie calls for a movement analysis was presented by 
Kratzer (1989) with examples like the following: 
(49) (What a copycat you are! You visit all the nice places I have visited.) 
No, I onlYl went to TANGLEWOODFl because you did. 
Kratzer shows that In Rooth's original approach, the VP anapher would be spelled out as In: 
I only went to TANGLEWOOD becallSe you went to TANGLE WOOD. This implies two foci 
that are, in principle, independent of each other, or a complex focus. However, example (49) 
involves only one simple focus; its reading can be rendered as: Only for x=Tanglewood it holds 
that I went to x because you went to x. Kratzer develops a theory, based on a version of 
alternative semantics mentioned in Rooth (1985), that generates this reading without 
assuming LF-movement, but with the help of a separate process of variable binding. 
The current framework allows for other solutions within structured meanings, assuming 
certain conditions for comparability. First, look at the following derivation, where we 
assume that the antecedent VP replaces the anaphor. 
(50) went to [Tllnglewood)F ;  VP ;  dy1x.went-to(x,y), t> 
I 
I you did (= went to [Tllnglewood)F) ; S 
I dyh.went-to(x,y), t>(you), '" dy.wenHo(you,y), t> 
I I 
I I beaJuse ; 1p1P1x.becaase(P(x), p) 
1 1 / 
I beaJuse you did ; dy1Ph.because(P(x), went-to(you,y», t> 
1/ 
went to Toglnoootl because you did ; VP 
d.y.y'h.because(went-to(x,y), went-to(you,y'» > 
I 
I only ;  FO ;  only 
1/ 
only went to TII1I81ewood beaJuse you did ; VP ; h[because(went-to(x,t), went­
to(you,t» &: 'dyey'[y.y'-tet &:because(went-to(x,y), went-to(you,y'» -+ 
y.y'-tetl1 
I 
I I ; NP ; I 
1/ 
I only went to TII1I81ewood beaJuse you did ; S ;  because(went-to(I,t), went­
to(you,t» &: 'dyey'[y.y'.tet &: because(went-to(I,y), went-to(you,y'» -+ yey'-tet] 
Let us assume that the interpretation of conditions like yey'-tet implies not only that y-t and 
y'-t, but also that y=y', as the elements of the right-hand side are equal. In general, we 
require that whenever X1.X2 ..... Xn-Y.Y ..... Y, then X1=X2= ... =Xn• Given that, we can reduce 
the second part of the final representation as: 'dy[y-t &: because(went-to(l,y), went­
to(yoa,y» -+ y-t). The reading we get, then, can be paraphrased as: I went to Tanglewood 
because you went to Tanglewood, and there is no alternative y to Tanglewood such that I went 
to Y because you went to y. 
An objection against this analysis is that it would treat cases like (SO) similar to cases where 
the anaphor is fully spelled out, as in 
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(51 ) I only went to TANGLEWOOD because you went to TANGLEWOOD. 
The only plausible interpretation of (51) is one in which the first occurrence of Tanglewood 
is, or is contained in, the focus of only, and the second one is the focus of the illocutionary 
operator, which can be paraphrased by: The reason why I only went to Tanglewood is because 
you went to Tanglewood. This suggests a principle saying that a complex focus (whose parts 
are associated with the same operator) cannot contain identical overt foci. Note that one 
would need an explanation of this phenomenon even if one would adopt Kratzer's solution, as 
her theory only makes a claim about anaphors in focus and would allow for only to be 
associated with both foci in (51). 
4.4. THE SCOPE OF FOCUS OPERATORS. - In section (3), we didn't assume any particular 
scoping rules for focus operators. Although they are essentially propositional operators, we 
claimed that it is sufficient that the representations they operate on have a type that ends in 
t .  
This guarantees that a focus operator always has the most narrow possible scope. To see this, 
consider at a case where an focus operator has an AP in scope. As such constructions are 
marginal in English (except with comparatives, e.g. an even bigger az,), I will discuss a 
German example: 
(52) Peter bufte ein nurt [MI'ITELMAssIGES]F1 Auto 
Peter bought an only average car 
The crucial thing is that nu, has scope over the adjective and has to be prevented from taking 
wide scope, over the whole NP, the VP, or the sentence. This is done naturally when we 
assume that adnominal APs are nominal modifiers of the type «e)tXe)t. Given an obvious 
rule for the combination of AP's with N's, we get the following interpretation, where M is a 
variable of type «e)tXe)t and semantic combination is by functional application: 
(53) mittelmll/liga ; APp ; dM.M, average> 
I 
I nu1 ; FO ; oaly  
1/ 
nu, mittelmil/ligts ; AP ; only( dM.M, average» 
= AP1x[average<PXx) at \fM[M.average at M(PXx) � M-average)) 
I 
I Auto ; N ;  car 
1/ 
nu, mittelmll/ligts Auto ; N 
1x[average(carXx) at VM[M .. verage at M(car)(x) � M=average)) 
I 
I an ; Det ; AP'1P3x[P(x) at P'(x)] 
1/ 
an nur mittelmil/ligts Auto ; NP ; 
1P3x[p(x) at average(carXx) at \fM[M-average at M(carXx) � M=average)) 
Thus, the focus operator nu, is applied directly to the AP. We get a predicate that applies to 
average cars, but not to cars that have another property comparable to average. Given a more 
refined analysis of only that considers its scalar properties (d. e.g. Jacobs 1983), this means 
that the predicate applies to cars that are maximally of average quality, but not of a higher 
quality. 
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One observation that might be a counterexample to the claim that focus operators have the 
most narrow scope possible was reported by Taglicht (1984). According to him, the following 
sentence has two readings: 
(54) We are required to study only syntax. 
a .  It is required that we study syntax and no other subject. 
b. Only for syntax and for no other subject it is required that we study it. 
In the latter reading, the expression only syntax gets wide scope over required. Note that the 
wide scope interpretation of only is not possible when it is an adverbial modifier, as in we aTe 
required to only study syntax. A plausible explanation of this phenomenon was put forward by 
Rooth (1985): NPs in general can have wide-scope reading (witness the specific interpretation 
of a book in we are required to retUl a book), and NPs with focus operators take part in that. 
That is, focus operators do not get wide scope on their own, but only when carried "piggy_ 
back" by an expression that can get wide scope. However we will implement wide-scope 
readings of NPs - LF-movement, quantifying-in, or operator storage -, this should carry over 
to cases like (54). 
4.5. FOCUS ON REFLEXIVES AND REOPROCALS. - Interesting problems arise in cases like 
the following, where a focus operator is associated with a reflexive or reciprocal pronoun: 
(55) a .  Johni loves only himselfi. 
b. Dohn and Maryli love only each otherj. 
The analysis of (54.a) is relatively straightforward if we assume that reflexives are terms 
Al'.P(Xi), where the variable Xi has to be bound by its antecedent (in the case at hand, the 
subject). Without going deeper into the modelling of this binding, let us assume that the 
subject in (55.a) is represented by a term AP3xilP(xi) &: Xj=j] that binds the variable Xi (where 
a free variable Xi in the argument doesn't get replaced during application). Then we get the 
following interpretation, which says that John loves John, and John loves no alternative to 
John. 
(56) himself ; NPj ; lP.P(Xj) 
I 
himself ; NPiF ; <A.T.T, lP.P(xi» 
I 
I only ; FO ; only 
1/ 
only himself ; NP ; lP[P(xi) &: Vy[y-xi &: P(y) -. y=xj]J 
I 
I loves ; V' ; love 
1/ 
loves only himself ; VP ; h[love(x,xj) &: Vy[y-xi &: love(x,y) -. y=xj]l 
I 
I John ; NPj ; AP3xj[P(xi) &: Xj=j] 
1/ 
John lovts only himself ; S ;  3xdlove(Xi,Xj) &: VY[Y-Xj &: love(xj,y) -. y=xd &: 
Xj=jJ 
= love(j,j) &: Vy[y-j &: love(j,y) -. y=jJ 
Jl 
o .  
a IlL. f 
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The treatment of reciprocals requires some more effort. I will sketch one way how it can be 
done. Let us assume that we have a sum formation on individuals, fB, such that whenever x, y 
are individuals, so is xE9y; fB should be the join operation of a join semi-lattice (d. Unk 1983). 
In particular, fB is a symmetric operation, that is, x(By = y(Bx. We also assume a list operation 
- that is asymmetric. Verbal predicates and relations in natural language typically are 
cumulative with respect to fB in the sense that whenever P(x) and P(y), then P(xfBy), and 
whenever R(x,x') and R(y,y'), then R(xfBx',yfBy'). Furthermore, we assume that natural­
language predicates and relations in general are cumulative and distributive with respect to 
list formation; that is, p(x) &: P(y) H P(x-y) and R(x,x' )  &: R(y,y') H R(x-x',y-y'). All this 
can be imposed by suitable meaning postulates. 
The reciprocal anaphor etlch other, just like the reflexive, is bound by an antecedent. It 
requires that this antecedent is a list I, and it imposes that the verbal predicate applies to 
the REOPROCAL V ARlANT of that list. Before I give a general definition of this notion, let us 
look at two examples: The reciprocal variant of the list j-b is b-j, and the reciprocal variant 
of j-b-s is bfB.-jfB.-jfBb. In general, l' is the reciprocal variant of I iff I and l' have the same 
length, and the n-th element of l' is the sum individual of all elements of I with the exception 
of its n-th element. Let us assume a function rec that maps lists to their reciprocal variants. 
Then the meaning of etlCh otherj is the term AP.P(rec(xi». Let us assume that coordination can 
be interpreted as list formation. I give an example that shows the treatment of sentences 
with the reciprocal in focus: 
(57) etlCh other ; NPi ; AP.P(rec(xj» 
I 
etlCh other ; NPp ;  dT.T, AP.P(rec(xj»> 
I 
I only ;  FO ; only 
1/ 
only etlCh other ; NP ;  AP(P(rec(xi» &: 'o'y(y-rec(xi) &: P(y) -+ y=reC(xi))) 
I 
I lwe ; V', love 
1/ 
loDe only etlCh other ; b[love(x,rec(xi» &: 'o'y[y-rec(xi) &: love(x,y) -+ 
y-rec(xi))) 
I 
I John, Bill tnul Sue ; NP ; AP3xj[P(xi) &: xi=j-b-.] 
1/ 
John, Bill and Sue ltn1e only au:h other ; 3xj[love(xi,rec(xi» &: 
'o'y[y-rec(xi) &: love(Xj,y) -+ y=rec(xi» &: xi=j-b-.] 
= love(j-bes, bfBsej(Bs-JfBb) &: 'o'y(y-bfBsej(BsejfBb &: love(j-b .. ,y) -+ 
y=bEBaejE9sejEBb] 
Under the assumption that only lists with the same number of elements are comparable, that 
love is divisive for both lists and sums, and that all atomic individuals are comparable to 
each other, this amounts to the following: 
love(j,b) &: love(J,s) &: 'o'y[love(j,y) -+ y=b v y=s] &: 
love(b,j) &: love(b,s) &: 'o'y(love(j,y) -+ y=j v y=s] &: 
love(.,j) &: love(.,b) &: 'o'y[love(j,y) -+ y=j v y=b] 
This gives the readon of our example. However, the treatment of reciprocals is still in­
complete in several respects: I have showed only how the "strict" interpretation of reci-
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procaIs can be modelled, leaving aside the more liberal interpretation which is predominant 
in cases like John, Bill tnul MIlry took f!tlch otlru by the hand; I did not say anything about 
the formation of coordinated NPs; and I did not talk about cases with plural subjects, such as 
The children Ioue only au:h otIru. However, it should have become clear that a treatment of 
reciprocals with the help of list individuals is feasible, and can be combined with a 
semantics for focus operators like only in a straightforward way. 
4.6. DO WE NEED COINDEXINC? - In the framework developed above, we did without 
coindexing between focus operators and focus. The rules that restrict the association between 
focus operator and focus are such that they narrow down possible choices. There are two 
potential problems with this approach: First, the principles may not be restrictive enough for 
some cases, and second, they might be 100 restrictive. 
As for the first case, note that we can generate examples like the following a use coindexing 
here simply as a convenient description device): 
(58) John evenl [vp onln [Vto introduced [BiD]F21 [to Sue]F1 
We arrive at this interpretation by focusing on Bill, combining only with the Vto-expression, 
focusing on Sue, and combining erJeJI with the VP. The resulting meaning can be described as 
follows: John introduced BiD to Sue, he did nothing else to Sue, and there are persons x besides 
Sue for which it is more likely that John introduced Bill to x and did nothing else to x. Does 
the sentence have this reading? It seems to me that it has it, especially if stressed on Sue, and 
uttered without pause in only introtlru:ed Bill. 
As for the second case, the most serious objection may be raised against the assumption that a 
focus operator is associated with the most comprehensive focus in its scope (d. 17). We 
haven't seen evidence that supports that claim. so let us look at e1evant cases. It is not easy to 
come up with convincing examples, but perhaps the following wiD do. The adverb preferIIbly 
is focus-sensitive, which can be seen with examples like John prefeNbly drinks WINE, which 
means that of all the drinks, John prefers to drink wine. Now look at the following example: 
(59) [Bill preferabln drinks [Australian WINE]F1, and] 
John eveno preferabln drinks [(TASMANIAN]FO wine]F1. 
Here, it is said that John prefers Tasmanian wine to other drinks, and that there are m0-
difiers X such that it would be more likely that John prefers X wine to other drinks. This 
seems to be a valid reading of our example, especia1Iy in the given context. - Now let us look 
at the opposite case: 
(60) [BiU preferabln drinks [TASMANIAN]F1 beer, and ] 
? John eveII() preferabln drinks [[Tasmanian]F1 wine]FO 
Here we would expect the interpretation: John prefers Tasmanian wine to other wines, and it 
is more likely that there is some drink X such that John prefers Tasmanian X to other X. It is 
at least questionable whether there is such a reading. Of course, we get a reading for John 
weno ",eferablyl drinks [T/lSmllnUrn [WINE]FO]Fl, as predicted: John prefers Tasmanian 
wine to other drinks, and there are drink types X (e.g. beer) such that it would be more likely 
that John prefers Tasmanian X to other drinks. 
There is, however, one class of examples that sheds doubt on our assumption (Hubert 
Truckenbrodt, personal communication). It is known that gapping is a focus..sensitive process, 
in the sense that the gap in one coordination part corresponds to the background in the other 
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coordination part (d. Sag 1977, Truckenbrodt 1988). Assuming that coordination expresses two 
assertions (alternatively, coordination itself can be analyzed as focus-sensitive), we can 
analyze gapping as in the following example: 
(61 ) JOHN met MARY and BILL, SUE. 
ASSERTO OOHNJFO met (MARY]F01 and ASSERTdBILLrol gap (SUE)FOJ 
ASSERT(d.x-y.met(x,y), j-m» &: ASSERT« (copyJ , b-.» 
1 
___________________ 1 
Now let us look at an example that contains, in addition, an overt focusing operator: 
(62) JOHN drank only TASMANIAN wine, and BILL, AUSTRAUAN BEER. 
ASSERTO OOHNJR) drank onlyt [(TASMANlANJF1 wineJro and 
ASSERTO (BILL]R) gap [(AUSTRAUAN]Fl BEERJFO 
We are interesting in an interpretation where the second conjuct has to be spelled out as: Bill 
drtmk only AUSTRAUAN beer. If this interpretation exists, then we have a counterexample 
to our assumption, as only focusses not on the most comprehensive focus in its scope. It is not 
entirely dear, however, whether examples like (62) are grammatical, with the intended 
interpretation. 
In this section, I could give only limited evidence for our assumption that a focus operator is 
associated with the most comprehensive focus in its domain. If further data shows that this 
is not the case, then the focus rule SF has to be folUluJated in an indetelUlinistic way • If, on the 
other hand, cases of embedded foci that neither contain intervening focus operators, such as 
(19.c), nor focus on one and the same constituent, such as (19.d), are considered to be in general 
bad, than SF has to be refOIUlUlated in such a way that it can never apply to a focus­
background representation to begin with, but may apply to one constituent and generate a 
multiple focus on that constituent at once (to cover indisputable cases like 19.d). 
4.7. ASSERTIONAL MEANING AND PREsupPOSmONS. - The analysis of focus-sensitive 
operators like only and efJeJI we have given so far neglects one well-known aspect of their 
semantics, namely that we have to distinguish between the assertional meaning on the one 
hand and the presupposition or conventional implicature on the other (d. Hom 1969) Taking 
constancy under negation as a test for presuppositions, we can observe that a sentence like John 
only drtln1c flMfer asserts that John didn't drink anything but water, and presupposes that 
John drank water. And we observe that a sentence like John drtmk erJen Wtlfer asserts that 
John drank water, and presupposes that it would have been more likely for John to drink 
something else. 
(63 a .  - John drank only water. 
- No. (i.e., John drank something besides water, too; not; John didn't drink water.) 
b. - John drank even water. 
- No. (i.e., John didn't drink water; not: it was likely for John to drink water). 
We might ask whether it is possible to extend the framework developed above so that it 
incorporates the distinction between assertion and presupposition, something that was done 
by Lyons &: Hirst (1990) for Alternative Semantics. Cases with complex foci will natura1ly be 
of particular interest. For example, consider (12), here repeated as (64): 
(65) - John even1 (onlY2 (drank WATERJF21Fl. 
y r To 
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- No. (i.e., John did other, comparable things as well). 
As the negation test shows, this sentence asserts that John did not do other things comparable 
to drinking water. Its other meaning components listed under (12), then, must be its 
presuppositions - viz., that John drank water (coming from only), and that there are ac­
tivities comparable to drinking walei' and doing nothing else for which it is more probable 
that John performed them (coming from eDen). Note that we have to refer to both the 
assertional meaning and the presupposition coming from only to express this second 
presupposition. 
How can we spell out the semantics of focusing operators like only, taking into account the 
assertional part and the presuppositional part? Perhaps the most explicit theory that was 
designed to treat assertional meaning and presuppositional meaning in a mmpositional way is 
Karttunen & Peters (1979). In particular, they include a treatment of eDen, although they 
disregard the influence of focus-backgrouncl structures. Here I want to show how their theory 
can be mmbined with the framework of structured meanings. 
Karttunen & Peters represent (assertional) meanings and presuppositions on two separate 
levels, which contain what the sentece EXPRESSES and what it IMPLICATES. (i.e., pre­
supposes). This is rendered fonnally as a pair <E, I>, where E and I are of the same type. 
Karttunen & Peters show how meanings and presuppositions of complex expressions can be 
computed from the meanings and presuppositions of their parts, using a special "heritage 
function". 
How are meaning-presuppositon structures and focus-background structures related to each 
other? Examples like (65) suggest that focus-background structures always have "wide scope" 
over meaning-presupposition structures. Here I will not introduce a formal semantic 
framework for meaning-presupposition structures, as this would lead us too far astray. I will 
restrict the discussion to one illustrative example.that shows how cases with several 
focusing operators can be treated in principle. 
In the following, I assume, for the sake of exposition, that Ilnnle presupposes that the agent 
of the drinking is animate, and that the substance that is drunk is fluid. These pre­
suppositions are projected to the complex expression, Ilranle WGfer, with a mechanism Hke the 
one given by Karttunen & Peters. The alternatives of focus-sensitive operators, like eoen, then 
may be determined by the conjunction of the meaning and the presupposition of the focus 
element; note that we have to assume a conjunction generaHzed for an types based on t, as the 
focus often will not be of a sentential type. The revised meaning postulates for only and eoen 
are obvious from the following example, so I will not specify them separately. 
(66) Ilranle TlNJfer; V ; <Ax3y[drank(x,y) & W(y)], b[anim(x) & fluid(W)]> , abbr. 
<[1], [2]> 
I 
SF Ilranle fDIlfer ; VPp ;  dP.P, <[1], [2]» 
I 
I only ; FO ; only 
1 /  
So only Ilranle WGfer ; VP ;  only(dP.P, <[1], [2]») 
= <1x\fPlP .. [I] &: P(x) -+ P = [1]1 [1]&[2]>, abbr. <[3], [4]> 
I 
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SF only d,.nk fDtlter ; VPp ; dP.P, <[3], [4]» 
I 
I even ; FO ; evm 
1 /  
So even only d",nk fDtlfer ; VP ; even(d.P.P, <[3], [4]») 
= <[3] , b3P[P-[3]&£[4] &£ [3]&£[4](x) <p P(x) ] > 
I 
I John ; NP ; � .P(j) 
1 /  
John even only dNnk fDtlfer ; S ; <[3](j) , 3P[P-[3]&[4] &£ [3]&[4] (j) <p P(j)]> 
The meaning part of this pair, [3](j), expresses that everything that John did was drinking 
water, or more correctly, that no property P comparable, but not identical to the property of 
drinldng water applies to John. Note that this is also the meaning of the simpler sentence 
John only dNnk fDtlfer, which shows that ewn does not change the meaning of an expression. 
The presupposition part of that pair says that there is a property P comparable to the 
property of only drinking water such that this property would more likely apply to John. 
More precisely, it claims this of a property P that applies to persons that didn't do anything 
comparable, but not identical to drinking water, that drank water, that are animate, and for 
which it holds that water is a fluid. It seems unclear whether the latter two properties 
(abbreviated as [2]) should be part of the determination of the alternatives. However, we 
need at least the presupposition introduced by only (abbreviated as [1] ), and as it is not 
plausible that we keep track of the origins of a presupposition, we are forced to take all 
presuppositions accumulated so far (here represented by [4]). Note, again, that it is crucial 
that the detennination of the alternatives may refer to both the meaning and the 
presuppositions of the semantic representation of its focus. We have assumed this for the 
alternatives for wen; we may assume the same for the alternatives for only, for the sake of 
greater homogeneity. 
4.8. TOPIC-COMMENT STRUCTURES. - Let us finally tum to a particularly vexing 
problem. It was pointed out by Jacobs (1988, to appear) with examples like the following one: 
(67) SUE KISSED John. 
There is a reading involving a complex focus on Sue and kissed, as an answer to a qestion like 
Who dill _t to John?, which can be derived in a standard way (d. 67' .a). In addition, there 
is also a reading where Slle and Idssetl seem to form a simple focus, at least semantically: (67) 
may be an answer to WIIlIt Iuq1peneJl to John?, where the focus is equivalent to fDtlS kisSl!Il by 
Sue. For this case, we would be inclined to assume the representation (67' .b): 
(67') a .  ASSEllT(d.xell.R(j,x), IJduecl» 
b. ASSEllT(�.P(j), 1xJdssed(I,x» ) 
The problem here is how to arrive at representation (b) in a compositional way, given that 
the parts of the sentence that correspond to the focus do not form a syntactic constituent at any 
level, according to standard analyses of these sentences. 
One way to do overcome this problem is to assume that the sentences in question indeed have 
an analysis in which the parts in focus form a syntactic constituent. This could be expressed 
quite naturally in a syntactic framework like categorial grammar with liberal rules of 
category composition. Advocates of categorial grammar may welcome these facts as another 
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argument for flexible combination rules, in addition to coordination data like right node 
raising, as in Sue kissed lind Mary teased John (d. Steedman 1985, Dowty 1987). 
Another way is to analyze these cases not as involving peculiar focus-background structures, 
but as rather regular TOPIC-COMMENT structures. The relevant examples of purported non­
constituent focus all have a purported background that IS a constituent, and they are examples 
that answer questions like What happened to %? So we might analyze them as cases where 
the purported background is, in fact, the topic of the sentence, and the purported focus is the 
comment 
Topic-comment structures can be captured with the same technique as focus-background 
structures, namely structured meanings. Actually, Dahl (1974) proposed both a separate 
treatment of focus-background structures and topic-comment structures, and a way to model 
them that can be seen as a precursor of structured meanings. 
One crucial question at this point is how topic-comment structures and focus-background 
structures interact. It seems that we should allow for both the comment and the topic to consist 
of focus-background structures (d. Jacobs 1984); witness the following examples: 
(68) a .  -Who(m) did Sue kiss? 
-[Sue]T [kissed Oohn]F]C 
b. -What did Bill's sisters do? 
-[Bill's [YOungest]F sister]T [kissed John]C· 
In (68.a), kissed John arguably is the comment, and it contains a focus, John. And in (68.b), 
Bill 's youngest sister arguably is the topic, and it contains a focus, youngest. We also might 
analyze kissed John as a focus of the comment in this case; alternatively, we might skip 
aSSignment of focus, given a rule that whenever the comment does not contain any focus 
feature, it should be considered as focus itself. 
This suggests the following framework for topic-comment structures: Topic-comment structures 
are labelled pairs qa,lb, where a is the comment and p is the topic. Both a and p may be 
simple, or they may contain focus-background structures. lllocutionary operators, like 
assertion, may take topic-comment-structures as their argument. We have the following rule 
for assertions applying to simple topic-comment structures: 
(69) If a, P are not focus-background structures, then: 
ASSERT(qAX.a. P» maps a conunon ground c to a common ground c', where c' is 
the intersection of c with the set of possible worlds for which A.X.a(p) is true, i.e. 
c'=cn[AX.a(p») 
Felicity conditions: 
- c'�, c'#lJ, and there are salient Y, Y.AX.a, Y�.a, such that Y could have 
been asserted of p. That is, it would have changed c, cn[Y(P») �, it would not be 
excluded by c, cn[Y(a») "F- 0, and would have yielded a different output context, 
cn[Y(p») "F- cn[A>C.a(p»); 
- p is a possible topic in c, that is, p, or something closely related to p, was 
mentioned in the immediately preceding discourse, or is part of the environment 
of speaker and hearer, or is something the speaker and hearer talk regularly 
about 
The first set of felicity conditions covers the conditions specified in (7); the only difference is 
that now the first member of the pair qu,p> counts as "focus". The second set of felicity 
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conditions is concerned with the topic; it leaves much to be explained, but should give an idea 
of a possible way to spell out the semantic impact of topics. 
We have to change (69) slightly for complex topic-comment structures. I propose the fol­
lowing: 
(70) a .  ASSEKT(q�<a.P>, 'P) maps a common ground c to a common ground c', where 
c' = Cf"\[AX[a(�)](y)]. Fetidty conditions: 
- C'>IC, c'"IQJ, and there are salient Y, Y.�, Y*p such that AX[a(Y)] could have been 
asserted of 'Yi 
- Y is a possible topic in c. 
b. ASSEKnq�a,. <�,'P» maps a common ground c to a common ground c', where 
c' = Cf"\[AX.a(�(y» ]. Felicity conditions: 
- C'>IC, c'"IQJ 
- �(y) is a possible topic in C, and there are saHent Y, Yay, Y"#'f such that �(Y) is a 
possible topic in c as well. 
c. ASSEKnq�<a,.�, q,6» maps a common ground c to a  common ground ft, 
where c' = Cf"\[AX[a(�)](1<6»]. Fetidty conditions: 
- C'>IC, c'"IQJ, and there are saHent Y, Y.�, Y*p such that AX[a(Y)] could have been 
asserted of 1<6); 
- 1<6) is a possible topic in c, and there are salient Y, Y-6, Y� such that l<Y) is a 
possible topic in c as well 
So the focus..backgrou structure in the comment determines alternative commeitts that could 
have been made about the topic, and the focus-background structure in the topic determines 
alternative topics that could have been "commented" upon. We should also account for the 
possibility of topic-Iess sentences (so-called tbetic sentences); in this case, we may assume our 
old assertion rule (7). 
Topic-comment structures and focus.-baclcground structures do interact in the derivation of a 
complex semantic representation. The basic principle is that topic-comment structures take 
precedence over focus-background structures. Furthermore, topic-comment structures are not 
recursive; we should allow, however, for the possibUity of mmplex topics, as attested e.g. in 
Hungarian (Kiss 1986). This leads to the following rules of functional apptication, in addition 
to the rules given in (21): 
(71 ) a .  <Ta,�>(y) = qAX.a(X)(y), �> 
b. 6(qa,�» = qAX.6(a(X» , �> (if 6 is simple) 
c. qa,�>« y,6» = qAX[a(X)(q,b)], �> 
d. q,6>« Ta�» = q4X[<y,6>(a(X» ], �> 
e.  <Ta,�>(<Ty,6» = qAX.X'[a(X)(l<X'))J, �.b 
(where X, X' are variables of the types of �, 6) 
I assume the rule ST for topicalization of a constituent of category C: 
(72) ST C -> CT (indexing of arbitrary category Y by topic feature T) 
(CF) " qAXJ(, [C ]>, where X is a variable of the type of [C ]. 
The topic feature can be spelled out in various ways, for example in the lIS for NP-construction, 
or in languages Hke Japanese and Korean by affixation of particles. As for accentual markings, 
the basic rule seems to be that topical constituents are de-accented (as a whole; they may 
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contain accents in case they contain a focus constituent, as in 68.b). This implies that the non­
topical constituents get accent (or "neutral stress", in the theory of Jacobs 1988, to appear). 
It is time to look at an example. Let's take one with a simple topic, John, and a comment, 
drtlnJc fDtlter, that contains a focus, fDtlter: 
(73) -What did John drink? 
-Jobrrr drank WATERF 
d,anJc [fDtlter]F i VP i d.Tb.T(1y.drank(x,y», water> 
I 
I John i NP  i Jolm 
I I 
I ST John i NPr i q1T.T, John> 
1 /  
SI John drtlnJc fDtlter i q1T.T, John>« 1Tb.T(1y.drank(x,y», water» 
= <T1T[1T.Tm« 1T1x.T(1y.drank(x,y», water» , John> 
= <T1T.T« 1T1x.T(1y.drank(x,y», water» , John> 
= <T1T.<1T.T(1x.T(1y.drank(x,y))), water» , John> 
I 
SI I .i 10 i ASSERT 
1/ 
ASSERT(q1T.dT.T(b.T(1y.drank(x,y))), water» , John» 
Spe1Iing out ASSERT: 
(69) maps a common ground c to a common ground c', where c' is the intersection of c 
with the worlds in which 1T[1T.T(b.T(1y.drank(x,y)))(water)](John) is true, 
that is, in which John(b.water(1y.drank(x,y))) is true, that is, in which 
3y[draDk(j,y) &t W(y)] is true. 
Felicity conditions: 
- C'>IC, c'>I:0, and there are salient Y, Y-water, Y;twater such that 
John(b.Y(1y.drank(x,y))) could have been assertedi 
- John is a possible topic in c. 
Now let us come back to our original example, (67). The two analyses can be given as follows. 
Note that in both cases, John is supposed to be the topic. 
(74) kissed i V' i kiss 
I 
I John i NPr i <T11T,John> 
1/ 
S2 kissed John i VP i q1T1x.T(1y.klss(x,y», John> 
I 
I Sue i NP i Sue 
1/ 
SI Sile kissed John i s  i <T1T.Sue(1x.T(1y.kiss(x,y))), John> 
Application of the assertion operator yields the following result: It is asserted that Sue 
kissed John, with the felicity condition that other salient properties Y that are comparable 
to 1T.Sue(b.T(1y.kiss(x,y))) (that is, be kissed by Sue) could have applied to John at the 
-
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current point in discourse. In addition, John must be a possible topic at the current point in 
discourse. 
(75) kissed ; V'F ; d.RR. kill> 
I 
I John ; NPr ; <TATI, John> 
1/ 
52 kissed John ; VP ;  <TATd.lU.x.T(Ay.R(x,y), kill» , John> 
I 
I Sue ; � ; <1TI, Sue> 
1/ 
51 Sue kissed John ; S ; 
<TAT<A1"-R.1"(b.T(Ay.R(X,y))), Sue-kisl>, John> 
Now the application operator yields the following result It is asserted that Sue kissed John, 
with the feHdty condition that there are salient pairs of representations T-R that are 
comparable to Sue-kill such that ATe1"(b.T(Ay. R(x,y))) (roughly, 1" did R to him) could 
have been asserted of John as well at the current point in discourse. Again, John must be a 
possible topic at the current point in discourse. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have bied to develop a coherent semantic framework that can capture 
sentences with multiple focus, both free focus and focus bound by overt operators. Structured 
meanings turned out to be a suitable representation fonnat, and I have shown how a 
compositional semantics can be developed for those sentences within that fonnat. In doing 
this, we have seen that much of the burden that was assigned to syntax in coindexing 
approaches such as Jacobs (1984, 1988, to appear) can in fact be taken over by well-formedness 
principles in the semantic component. 
There are several directions into which this approach can be extended. One is to see whether 
we indeed need the full expressibility of structured meanings, or whether the more 
parsimonious framework of alternative semantics (d. Rooth 1985) can be worked out to cover 
multiple focus constructions as well. Secondly, we should address the various shortcomings 
mentioned in aection (4) above, such as focus assignment to expressions that are not sutface 
constituents, focus assignment to expressions that are not in the scope of their operator on 
surface structure, and a combination of the structured meaning framework with a way to 
express different scopings of NPs. Also, the proposed interaction between topic-comment 
structures and focus-baclcground structures needs much more work; it might tum out that 
insights of the theory of communicative dynamism, as developed in the Czech school by 
Firbas, Hajicova, Sgall and others are expresst"ble in this framework. FinaIly, it is necessary 
to extend the framework such that it can cover the impact of focus on the interpretation of 
quantifiers, such as .'wys (d. Rooth 1985, 1988) or the genericity operator (d. Krifka, to 
appear). To do this with the required generality, we must provide for a mechanism to express 
anaphoric bindings, which requires a dynamic semantic framework, such as discourse 
representation theory or one of its alternatives. 
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I had the opportunity to discuss issues of  this article with several collegues. Without the 
comments and cbaJlenges of Gennaro Chierchia, Jochen GeilfuP, Joachim Jacobs, Uwe Monnich, 
Richard Oehrle, Manfred Pinltal, Amim von Stechow, Hubert Truckenbrodt, Dietmar 
Zaefferer, and Ede Zimmermann, flaws would be more abundant, and coverage would be less 
broad. Thanks to them all. 
This article will be published also in Linguis tische Berich fe, Sonderheft 4: 
Informationsstruktur und Grammatik, ed. J. Jacobs. 
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